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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
NICHOLAS LAMARR, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellant, ) BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
vs. ) 
) Case No. 900574 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF ) 
TRANSPORTATION and SALT ) Category 16 
LAKE CITY, ) 
Defendant/Appellees. ) 
Defendant/Appellee, Salt Lake City ("the City"), pursuant to 
Rule 24(b) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the 
following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
The City agrees with the jurisdiction statement provided by 
Lamarr. This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal 
pursuant to §78-2-2(3)(j), Utah Code Annotated. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The City contends that the following issues are presented to 
this Court for review: 
1. Does the City have any duty to Lamarr concerning either 
transients under the North Temple overpass of the overpass. 
2. Was summary judgment on the issue of proximate causation 
appropriate given the hyperattenuated causal chain claimed by 
Lamarr? 
3. Does the existence of a population of transients under a 
State owned and maintained overpass create a "defective, unsafe 
or dangerous condition" of the State highway above for which 
governmental immunity of the City been waived? 
4. Is the City immune from Lamarr's action under the 
"discretionary function" rule? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
The interpretation of the following statutory provisions is 
determinative of certain issues on appeal. These statutes are 
excerpted and set out in the addendum to this Brief pursuant to 
Rule 24(f) (2) URAP. 
§27-14-2 Utah Code Annotated (1987) 
§27-14-4 Utah Code Annotated (1987) 
§63-30-4 Utah Code Annotated (1987) 
§63-30-8 Utah Code Annotated (1987) 
§63-30-9 Utah Code Annotated (1987) 
§63-30-10 Utah Code Annotated (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This is a negligence action brought 
by Lamarr against the City and the Utah State Department of 
Transportation ("UDOT") alleging that the City and UDOT were 
negligent in failing to control transients under the North Temple 
overpass which caused Lamarr to illegally walk in the roadway 
over the overpass which caused another car to hit another car 
which hit and injured Lamarr. 
B. Course of Proceedings. After discovery was conducted 
the City and UDOT moved for summary judgment. After briefing and 
oral argument the trial court granted summary judgment in favor 
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of the City and UDOT, concluding that: 
1. Defendant Salt Lake City owed no general duty to 
the plaintiff for the construction, maintenance and signing 
of the North Temple overpass. 
2. The defendant Salt Lake City owed no private duty 
to the plaintiff for controlling the transient population 
under the North Temple overpass; 
3. The conduct of the defendants Salt Lake City and 
UDOT was not a proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries; 
4. Any duty of the defendant Salt Lake City to control 
the transient population under the North Temple overpass is 
an immune discretionary function under Utah Code Ann. §63-
30-10(a); and 
5. The construction, maintenance and signing of the 
North Temple overpass is not an immune discretionary 
function under Utah Code Ann. §63-30-10(a). 
(See Order of Dismissal, R. 287-290, attached as Appendix B to 
the Appellant's Brief.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
The factual statement submitted in the Appellant's brief is 
correct as far as it goes. However, certain key facts have been 
omitted and one key fact should be reemphasized. 
1. North Temple, and the North Temple overpass, is a State 
highway. §27-12-49.1, Utah Code Annotated. 
2. The accident in which Lamarr was injured involved one 
car, driven by a friend or relative of Lamarr's, improperly 
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turning into another car which, in turn, struck Lamarr. (R. 3,) 
3. A walkway or sidewalk existed providing pedestrian 
access between the two ends of the overpass and Lamarr knew of 
this alternative but decided not to use it. (R. 3.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. An essential element of a negligence case is the 
existence of a duty owed by the plaintiff to the defendant. This 
Court has previously held that in an action against a 
governmental entity the plaintiff must show not just a "general 
duty" to perform an act for the benefit of the public but, 
instead, a "special duty" on behalf of the governmental entity to 
the injured party. See Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1989). 
Lamarr has failed to establish this "special duty" and, in 
fact, has failed to establish any duty whatsoever on behalf of 
the City concerning the State owned North Temple overpass. The 
State statute allowing the City to post pedestrian signs along 
State highways has not created a mandatory duty to do so. 
Further, no duty was created by any knowledge of the City of any 
defective condition because the City never had any notice that 
the transients under the overpass were causing persons to 
illegally walk in the roadway over the overpass. 
2. As a matter of law, Lamarr has failed to establish a 
proximate causal relationship. In a Rube Goldberg attempt to 
show causation, Lamarr's Brief ignores the two controlling Utah 
cases concerning the relationship between proximate causation and 
4 
intervening causes. Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises/ 697 P. 2d 
240 (Utah 1985) and Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985) 
establish that summary judgment is proper, unless the plaintiff 
establishes a direct causal relationship between the defendant's 
alleged negligence and the injury. Further, Mitchell and 
Williams hold that an intervening act of negligence will break 
the chain of causation if the intervening act is not 
"foreseeable". Here, Lamarr alleges that the negligence of the 
City in failing to control the transients caused Lamarr to 
illegally walk in the roadway of the North Temple overpass which 
caused the driver of a car looking for Lamarr to swerve into 
another car which, finally, hit and injured Lamarr. This 
hyperattenuated causal chain is completely unforeseeable as a 
matter of law. 
3. Transients under the North Temple overpass are not a 
"defective" condition of the State owned overpass waiving the 
City's immunity. The plain language of §63-30-8, U.C.A., does 
not include transients within the ambit of a "dangerous or 
defective" condition which has been held to mean such things as 
defective manhole covers, obstructions in the roadway, icy roads 
and similar physical conditions of the roadway itself. 
4. Finally, the City is immune from any claims under the 
"discretionary function" doctrine. Decisions concerning the 
management of the City's transient population and whether or not 
the City chooses to supplement the State's signage of pedestrian 
ways adjacent to State highways meet the tests of being a 
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"policy" decision established by this Court in Rocky Mountain 
Thrift Stores, et al. v. Salt Lake City, et al., 784 P.2d 459 
(Utah 1989). This Court will not second guess the City in its 
policy decisions where the plaintiff's bare allegation is that 
the City and UDOT should have "better" protected him from the 
transient population under the overpass. See, Duncan v. Union 
Pacific Railroad Company, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990). 
ARGUMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
Lamarr's claim in this case is the apotheosis of the 
"creativity" endemic to the personal injury plaintiff's bar. The 
first rule of any plaintiff's negligence case is to find a chain 
of causation, no matter how bizarrely tenuous, to a deep pocket. 
If the deep pocket happens to be a governmental entity, the 
plaintiffs then attempt superhuman leaps of illogic to show that 
the governmental entity has a non-delegable, non-immune duty to 
the world at large and every particular individual in it to make 
sure that no one gets hurt even through their own fault or random 
chance. 
On appeal Lamarr makes essentially four claims: 
1. That Lamarr has no requirement whatsoever to 
establish any duty on behalf of the City towards the 
plaintiff; 
2. That no matter how fanciful or attenuated the 
claimed chain of causation is, the issue of causation should 
always get to a jury. 
6 
3. That the existence of transients under a State 
highway overpass is somehow a "dangerous condition of a 
highway" and thus immunity has been waived by the City; and 
4. That this "dangerous condition" waiver also waives 
all other immunities which the City may have. 
The City will deal with these four issues seriatim. 
POINT I 
LAMARR HAS FAILED TO ESTABLISH ANY "DUTY" ON 
BEHALF OF THE CITY TOWARDS LAMARR. 
Lamarr's attempt to mislead this Court concerning the 
relationship between the "special duty" doctrine and the issue of 
governmental immunity demonstrates a fatal misreading of this 
Court's clear decisions. Lamarr would have this Court believe 
that the issue of immunity should be addressed first and, if 
immunity is found to be waived, there would be no requirement for 
Lamarr to show any duty whatsoever owed by the City to Lamarr. 
Of course, this Court has specifically decided the issue 
exactly the reverse. In Ferree v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 
(Utah 1989), this Court considered whether a wrongful death 
action could be brought against corrections officials by the 
family of a victim killed by an inmate on weekend release. This 
Court recognized in Ferree that sovereign immunity "is an 
affirmative defense and conceptually arises subsequent to the 
question of whether there is tort liability in the first 
instance." Ferree, supra at 153. The Court went on to explain 
that this order of analysis would allow courts to avoid "having 
to make difficult decisions with respect to the difficult 
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discretionary exception doctrine in sovereign immunity cases." 
Id. This Court further stated that "[djeciding an immunity 
question first may lead to unwarranted assumptions and confusion 
about undecided duty problems." Id. 
It is thus clear that the trial court's reasoning in 
considering the issue of "special duty" was correct. 
In Ferree this Court also stated the Hornbook principles of 
law governing the issue of duty which control this case. This 
Court held: 
To establish negligence or gross negligence, a 
plaintiff must first establish a duty of care owed by 
the defendant to the plaintiff. Beach v. University of 
Utah, 726 P.2d 413, 415 (Utah 1986); Weber ex rel. 
Weber v. Springville City, 725 P.2d 1360, 1363 (Utah 
1986); Prosser & Keeton on the Law of Torts §30, at 164 
(W. Keeton 5th Ed. 1984). Duty is "a question of 
whether the defendant is under any obligation for the 
benefit of a particular plaintiff. . . . " Prosser & 
Keeton, supra §53, at 356-57. The issue of whether a 
duty exists is entirely a question of law to be 
determined by the Court. Weber, 7 25 P.2d at 136 3; 
Prosser & Keeton, supra, §37 at 236. 
For a governmental agency and its agents to be liable 
for negligently caused injury suffered by a member of 
the public, the plaintiff must show a breach of a duty 
owed him as an individual, not merely the breach of an 
obligation owed to the general public at large by the 
governmental official. Obray v. Malmberg, 26 Utah 2d 
17, 19, 484 P.2d 160, 162 (1971) [ ]. 
Ferree, supra at 151 (emphasis added). 
It is difficult to imagine a clearer statement of law 
requiring Lamarr in this case to show a "special duty" as a 
condition precedent to any negligence allegation. Lamarr has, by 
consistently denying any requirement of showing a "special duty" 
relationship, established that he is claiming no such special 
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duty exists in this case. Further, no such special duty could 
even be alleged. 
Less than one month after deciding Ferree this Court 
considered another case involving the "essential element of a 
negligence claim [of] a duty owed by the defendant to the 
plaintiff." Owens v. Garfield, 784 P.2d 1187, 1189 (Utah 1989). 
In Owens, as here, the allegation was that a governmental entity 
owed a duty to the plaintiff to control the conduct of third 
persons. This Court noted that common law traditionally imposes 
no such duty except under two limited circumstances. The 
governmental entity would have a duty to control the activities 
of the third persons only if: (a) a special relationship existed 
between the governmental entity and the third person which 
imposed a duty upon the entity to control the third person's 
conduct, or (b) a special relationship existed between the entity 
and the plaintiff which gives to the plaintiff a right of 
protection. See Owens, supra at 1189, citing Hale v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 639 P.2d 203, 205 (Utah 1981) (quoting Restatement (2d) 
of Torts, §315 (1964)). 
In the instant case, as in Owens, "it is difficult to 
conceive, and [the plaintiffs have not attempted] to construct, 
an argument that [the City] had a sufficiently close relationship 
in a legal sense with [the transients or the other two drivers] 
to give rise to a duty to control [their] activities." Owens, 
supra at 1189. Further, Lamarr has failed to even argue for the 
existence of a special relationship between the City and Lamarr 
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giving Lamarr some special right of protection greater than that 
afforded to the public at large. If such a duty of protection 
could not be found under the egregious factual situation and 
statutory scheme of protection in Owens then surely none can be 
found here.1 
Further, as a matter of law, the City had no legal duty to 
construct pedestrian safety devices adjacent to the North Temple 
overpass. At most, §27-14-4, U.C.A. relied upon by Lamarr, says 
that the City "may" construct such devices in cooperation with 
UDOT. This grant of permission cannot be transformed by the 
plaintiffs into an actionable "duty" protecting either Lamarr 
individually or the public generally. A "duty" forming the basis 
of a negligence action involves a mandatory obligation running 
between parties. See Ferree, supra and Owens, supra. 
The word "may" in §27-14-4, U.C.A. imposes no such mandatory 
obligation. In Grant v. Utah State Land Board, 26 Utah 2d 100, 
485 P.2d 1035, 1037 (1971) this Court considered what the word 
"may" means in a legislative context. This Court began its 
analysis with the basic rule of statutory construction which 
assumes that the legislature used each term of a statute 
advisedly and that each term should be given an interpretation in 
accord with their usually accepted meanings unless the context 
Moreover, the "transients" are not without constitutional 
rights and cannot be unilaterally herded by the City like so many 
undesirable cattle to whatever location the City may choose. 
Absent the commission of some demonstrable criminal activity the 
individuals which Lamarr characterizes as "transients" have as 
much right as Lamarr to be congregating or standing under the 
North Temple overpass. 
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otherwise requires. While recognizing certain very limited 
exceptions, this Court held that "the word 'may' in its most 
usual meaning does not import certainty, but uncertainty." Id. 
(Footnotes omitted.) This Court further noted that if the 
legislature had intended the statutory language to be an absolute 
or mandatory requirement then the legislature could just as 
easily have used the word "shall" or "must". In another case, 
this Court has held that use of the word "may" implies a 
mandatory obligation only if it appears that the intent of the 
legislature was to impose a duty on the governmental entity. 
Board of Education of the Granite School District v. Salt Lake 
County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983). 
If the Court finds that the permissive "may" in §27-14-4, 
U.C.A. creates a mandatory "duty", the Court will effectively be 
requiring Salt Lake City and every other city, town or county 
with a State highway within its borders to "construct and 
maintain curb, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices." 
The financial and logistical impact of such a decision would be 
unfathomable.2 
Lamarr has also completely failed to establish another 
essential element of any "duty" which may allegedly be owed by 
the City. A basic rule of negligence law is that where the 
alleged negligence results from a dangerous or defective 
2Should this Court construe the "may" in §27-14-4, U.C.A., 
to be permissive rather than mandatory, the "discretionary 
function" governmental immunity of §63-30-10(a), U.C.A. would 
automatically apply. See Point IV below. 
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condition it must be shown that the property owner had notice of 
this dangerous condition. Clover v. Snowbird Ski Resort, P. 2d 
, 155 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 8 (Utah 1991); Peats v. Commercial 
Security Bank, 746 P.2d 1191 (Utah App. 1987). In the instant 
case, Lamarr has argued only that the City knew of the existence 
of the transients under the overpass. The mere presence of a 
certain class of people does not per se create a "dangerous 
condition" under the overpass. It certainly does not imply that 
the City had notice that the transients were creating a defective 
condition on the State owned overpass by forcing people to 
illegally walk in the roadway. (See footnote 1 above.) 
Lamarr has failed to demonstrate the essential "duty" 
element of negligence claim. The City had no special duty to 
Lamarr to control the transients, no duty whatsoever to anyone to 
post supplementary on a State highway and no notice, either 
actual or constructive, of the existence of any dangerous 
condition. Thus, the issue of immunity never needs to be 
reached. Absent a duty there can be no negligence liability. 
POINT II 
AS A MATTER OF LAW LAMARR HAS FAILED TO 
ESTABLISH A PROXIMATE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP. 
Lamarr's Brief completely fails to cite the two controlling 
cases in Utah explaining the relationship between the various 
possible causes of an injury and establishing the standard for 
determining when summary judgment is appropriate where the chain 
of proximate cause was broken by an independent intervening act. 
Mitchell v. Pearson Enterprises, 697 P.2d 240 (Utah 1985) and 
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Williams v. Melby, 699 P.2d 723 (Utah 1985). Mitchell involved a 
wrongful death action against a hotel wherein the plaintiff 
claimed that the hotel's negligent lack of reasonable security 
caused the murder of the plaintiff's husband. This Court 
reiterated the "standard definition" of proximate cause: 
[T]hat cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces 
the injury and without which the result would not have 
occurred. It is the efficient cause - the one that 
necessarily sets in operation the factors that 
accomplish the injury. 
Mitchell, supra at 245, citing State v. Lawson, 668 P.2d 479, 482 
and n. 3 (Utah 1984) . 
This Court noted that it was the plaintiff's burden to show 
that the defendant's alleged negligence was a substantial 
causative factor in the plaintiff's death. Adopting the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts analysis from §433(B), this Court 
indicated that the chain of proximate causation might not be 
broken by an alleged intervening negligent act of another person 
only if the intervening act was, itself, "foreseeable" as a 
result of the defendant's negligence. Mitchell, supra at 246. 
One month later, in Williams, this Court specifically 
reiterated its adoption of the Restatement (2d) of Torts §447 
rule regarding the foreseeability of the intervening or 
superseding direct cause of harm. The Restatement rule is 
phrased as a three part alternative. The intervening act of a 
third person does not supersede the defendant's negligence only 
if: (a) the defendant, at the time of his negligence, should 
have realized that a third person might act negligently, or (b) a 
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reasonable man in the place of the defendant, knowing the 
situation existing when the act of the third person was done, 
would not regard it as highly extraordinary that the third party 
had so acted; or (c) the intervening negligent act is a normal 
consequence of a situation created by the defendant's conduct and 
the manner in which the intervening act is done is not 
extraordinarily negligent. 
In considering this issue of intervening causation in the 
context of summary judgment we must return again to Mitchell 
where this Court noted that while, ordinarily, M[t]he issue of 
proximate cause is a matter to be submitted to the jury for its 
determination . . . in appropriate circumstances summary judgment 
may be granted on the issue of proximate cause." Mitchell, supra 
at 245 (footnotes omitted). In Mitchell, because of the lack of 
any evidence linking Mitchell's death with the hotel's allegedly 
inadequate security, this Court held that the chain of causation 
"would be totally speculative." Mitchell, supra at 245, quoting 
Staheli v. Farmersf Cooperative of Southern Utah, 655 P.2d 680, 
684 (Utah 1982). This Court in Mitchell held "[w]hen the 
proximate cause of an injury is left to speculation, the claim 
fails as a matter of law." 
The tests of Mitchell and Williams for summary judgment on 
the issue of proximate causation are met here. As a matter of 
law the City could not foresee that Lamarr would react to the 
presence of the transients in the area of the safe walkway by 
walking at night illegally in the roadway of a major street and 
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would be struck by a car which had been hit by another car which 
was looking for Lamarr. This chain of events is, if anything, 
even more bizarre than the classic first year torts case of 
Palsgraf v. Long Island Railway Company, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 
99 (1928). The Court will recall that in Palsgraf employees of 
the railroad were attempting to assist a late arriving passenger 
onto the train. These employees knocked a case of fireworks onto 
the train tracks which exploded. The shock wave of this 
explosion, in turn, knocked a set of scales over on to the 
plaintiff. 
Neither in Palsgraf nor here could the City have reasonably 
foreseen that this bizarre chain of occurrences might result in 
some injury to the plaintiff. Only Rube Goldberg could have 
foreseen the extraordinarily abnormal consequence of a driver 
looking for a pedestrian spotting him walking illegally in the 
roadway of an overpass because of some allegedly negligent 
condition below the overpass and then pulling into another car 
which eventually struck Lamarr. As a matter of law, the causal 
chain between the City's alleged failure to control the 
transients below the North Temple overpass and the automobile 
accident which injured Lamarr is too attenuated to be the basis 
of any liability. 
POINT III 
TRANSIENTS UNDER THE NORTH TEMPLE OVERPASS 
ARE NOT A "DEFECTIVE CONDITION" FOR WHICH 
IMMUNITY HAS BEEN WAIVED. 
The existence of transients under the North Temple overpass 
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is not a "defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any 
highway" for which governmental immunity has been waived. 
Statutes such as §63-30-8, U.C.A., which provides a limited 
immunity waiver for injuries caused by defective, unsafe or 
dangerous highways, have been held, in Utah and throughout the 
west, to mean physical conditions which make the roadway itself 
dangerous. These include: defective manhole covers, Wilson v. 
Salt Lake City, 13 Utah 2d 234, 371 P.2d 644 (1962); construction 
dirt piles left in a street, Nyman v. Cedar City, 12 Utah 2d 45, 
361 P.2d 1114 (1961); boulders from the road cut falling onto 
cars, Schlitters v. State, 787 P.2d 656 (Colo.App. 1989); the 
placement of obstructions in a roadway, Gallagher v. Albuquerque 
Metro Aroyo Flood Control Authority, 563 P.2d 103 (N.M.App. 
1977); improperly designed width of highway shoulders, Terranella 
v. City and County of Honolulu, 479 P.2d 210 (Hawaii 1971); 
insufficient maintenance during the winter, State v. Abbott, 498 
P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972); icy roads, Walker v. Coconino County, 473 
P.2d 472 (Ariz.App. 1970); and other similar defects. The City 
has found no case, and Lamarr has cited none, where human 
conditions under an overpass have been held to make the overpass 
itself defective. 
Moreover, §63-30-8 provides that immunity is waived only if 
the "defective conditions" caused the injury. There is 
absolutely no causal relationship between the transients below 
the overpass and the accident on top of the overpass. The 
transients had nothing to do with causing the multiple car 
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accident on the overpass. Lamarr has made absolutely no 
allegation that the overpass itself was defective in a way that 
caused the accident. Thus even if the transients under the 
overpass were a "defective condition", immunity is still 
maintained because the "defective condition" did not cause the 
injury. 
POINT IV 
THE CITY IS IMMUNE FROM THIS ACTION UNDER THE 
"DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION" ANALYSIS. 
Lamarr's Brief claims that §27-14-4(2), U.C.A., which allows 
cities to construct sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices 
adjacent to State highways creates a non-discretionary duty on 
the City to place pedestrian safety devices adjacent to every 
State highway. As noted in Point I above, the use of the word 
"may" in §27-14-4(2), virtually by definition, triggers the 
"discretionary function" preservation of immunity in §63-30-
10(l)(a), U.C.A. See Grant, supra. 
In Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, et al. v. Salt Lake City, 
et a h , 784 P. 2d 459 (Utah 1989), this Court reiterated the four 
tests for determining "discretionary function" immunity. Citing 
Little v. Utah State Division of Family Services, 667 P.2d 49, 51 
(Utah 1983), this Court set out the following test: 
(1) Does the challenged act, omission, or decision 
necessarily involve a basic governmental policy, 
program, or objective? 
(2) Is the questioned act, omission, or decision 
essential to the realization or accomplishment of that 
policy, program, or objective as opposed to one which 
would not change the course or direction of the policy, 
program, or objective? 
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(3) Does the act, omission, or decision require the 
exercise of basic policy evaluation, judgment, and 
expertise on the part of the governmental agency 
involved? 
(4) Does the governmental agency involved possess the 
requisite constitutional, statutory, or lawful 
authority and duty to do or make the challenged act, 
omission, or decision? 
Rocky Mountain Thrift Stores, supra at 463. 
Starting with the test number four, §27-14-4(2) establishes 
that the City has been permitted the authority to construct 
pedestrian safety devices adjacent to State highways. Concerning 
test number one, the "basic governmental policy" question, this 
is met by the "purpose" statement in §27-14-2, U.C.A. which 
recognizes that "adequate sidewalks and pedestrian safety devices 
are essential to the general welfare of the citizens of the 
state." 
Concerning test number two, "essential to the realization of 
the policy", the City's decisions as to where or where not to 
supplement the State's activities concerning State roads is 
clearly essential to the realization of the safety policy. 
Finally, concerning test number three, the "exercise of basic 
policy evaluation or judgment", unless this Court intends to 
mandate the construction of fully protected and signed pedestrian 
crossings or sidewalks adjacent to all State highways in every 
city, town and county, the actual placement of such sidewalks and 
devices clearly lies within the expertise and judgment of the 
City. 
As noted in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 79 0 
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P.2d 595, 601 (Utah App. 1990): 
Highway maintenance and improvement are predominately 
fiscal matters. Every highway could probably be made 
safer by further expenditures, but we will not hold 
fthe governmental entity] negligent for having to 
strike a difficult balance between the need for greater 
safety and the burden of funding improvements. As we 
pointed out in fGleave v. Denver & Rio Grande Western 
Railroad Company, 749 P.2d 660 (Utah 1988)], and as 
UDOT emphasizes here, there are hundreds of 
unelectrified railroad crossings in Utah, and it is not 
fiscally possible to equip them all with the best 
possible means of assuring traffic safety. Rather, 
UDOT prioritizes the crossings and allocated the 
limited funds available for crossing improvements. The 
role of the judiciary in that prioritization and 
allocation process is strictly limited. In a case 
seeking judicial review of that administrative process, 
we would exercise our reviewing function with deference 
to the administrative agency under the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard. However, in a tort action such 
as this, the deference to a governmental function is 
absolute unless waived, and we do not review it at all 
under tort principles. 
(Empha sis added.) 
The instant case is also analogous to Duncan in another 
regard. As the Court of Appeals noted in Duncan, the plaintiff's 
allegation was not that there was no attempt to control traffic 
as it approached the railroad. Rather, the plaintiff asserted 
that UDOT should have used a "better" means of warning traffic. 
Duncan, supra at 601. The Court of Appeals declined to second-
guess UDOT beyond any requirement for minimal warning and control 
of traffic. 
In the instant case, Lamarr's allegations are subject to the 
same weakness. There is no dispute that alternative routings 
were available for pedestrians to traverse the distance spanned 
by the North Temple overpass. Stairs and a ground level walkway 
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were taken by Lamarr while walking in one direction but shunned 
on the return trip. Thus, the very types of pedestrian access 
suggested by §27-14-4(2) were, in fact, in place. Lamarr only 
seeks to have this Court mandate some "better" pedestrian access. 
As in Duncan, this Court should decline to second guess the 
discretionary determination of the City and UDOT in determining 
the precise method chosen to allow pedestrian travel. 
The same "discretionary function" analysis also applies to 
the City's management of the transient population within the City 
whether that management is characterized as a "social welfare" or 
a "police" problem. Surely, managing and/or caring for the 
transient population is a discretionary "basic governmental 
policy" concerning the allocation of financial and human 
resources involving political, philosophical and even 
constitutional concerns. The decisions of the police or other 
agencies charged with meeting these goals and objectives are 
essential to the realization of the policy. Further, the 
transient management policy involves the exercise of basic policy 
evaluation, judgment and expertise in determining its scope, 
methods, expenditures, timing, etc. 
This Court may also want to reconsider and broaden its test 
for determining whether an act is "discretionary" and, therefore, 
immune in light of a recent United States Supreme Court decision 
construing the analogous "discretionary function" exemption under 
the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §2680(a). In United 
States v. Gaubert, U.S. , 59 L.W. 4244 (No. 89-1793, March 
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26, 1991), the United States Supreme Court held that the 
"discretionary function" exception retained sovereign immunity 
for the United States for matters which might be considered of a 
"routine or frequent nature" if they involved the exercise of 
"choice and judgment." This interpretation by the United States 
Supreme Court is broader than the Rocky Mountain Thrift/Little 
four-part analysis. 
The United States Supreme Court's holding in Gaubert 
recognizes that "discretion" is exercised and should be protected 
at many functional levels and not just at the upper levels of 
ultimate policy. While the City believes the decisions made in 
the instant case concerning the City's supplementation of the 
signage on the State highway or the management of the transient 
population are clearly discretionary even under Rocky Mountain 
Thrift Stores and Little they would be even more obviously immune 
under Gaubert. 
CONCLUSION 
Lamarr has ignored this Court's clear requirement that he 
must establish a "special duty" owed by the City to him as the 
sine qua non of his negligence case. No such duty can possibly 
exist here. The City's management of its transient population is 
not specially targeted for the protection of Lamarr. Further, 
the mere grant of permission to the City to construct 
supplemental pedestrian safety devices on State highways does not 
mandate their installation either generally or specifically for 
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the protection of Lamarr. 
Lamarr's alleged chain of a causal relationship in this case 
can be described as anything but proximate. The thigh bone may 
be connected to the hip bone, and for want of a nail a horse may 
have been lost, but the transients under the overpass had 
absolutely nothing to do with Lamarr illegally walking in the 
roadway being hit by one car which was hit by another car. 
Further, even if Lamarr had established any duty or 
proximate causal relationship, Lamarr has failed to establish 
that the existence of transients under the North Temple overpass 
is a "defective condition" of a highway for which immunity has 
been waived. Finally, any actions of the City concerning 
supplementary signage or transient management are clearly within 
this Court's definition of a "discretionary function" and are 
thus immune from action. 
Accordingly, the summary judgment granted below should be 
affirmed. 
DATED this 13* 
day of May, 1991. 
BRl^ Cfi R. BAIRD 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Salt Lake City 
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Am. JUT. 2d. — 39 Am. Jur. 2d Highways, Key Numbers. — Highways *» 973/4, 99V4; 
Streets, and Bndges § 75. Municipal Corporations «=» 646. 
C.J.S. — 40 C J.S. Highways §§ 175,176; 64 
CJ.S. Municipal Corporations § 1662. 
27-14-2. Purpose. 
The legislature recognizes that adequate sidewalks and pedestrian safety-
devices are essential to the general welfare of the citizens of the state. It is the 
opinion of the legislature that existing sidewalks within the state, especially 
in the most populated areas, are not adequate to service the walking public 
with a result of creating unnecessary hazards to pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic. It is the intent of this act to provide a means whereby a portion of the 
funds received by the counties and participating cities as B and C road funds 
may be used for the construction of curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian 
safety devices pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this act. The legislature 
deems it to be in the best interest of the state if pedestrian safety construction 
is to be performed on state highways that it be performed under the direction 
of the counties and participating cities pursuant to rules and regulations of 
the state Department of Transportation developed in cooperation with the 
counties and participating cities. It is the further intention of the legislature 
that the funds permitted to be expended pursuant to this act be deemed addi-
tional to funds normally used by counties and participating cities for sidewalk 
construction and shall not be used in substitution for local sidewalk construc-
tion funds. 
History: C. 1953, 27-14-2, enacted by L. Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 2. § 27-14-1. 
27-14-3. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) "Construction" means the function of constructing or reconstructing 
a sidewalk with or without curb and gutter and shall include land acqui-
sition, engineering or inspection and may be more fully defined by the 
rules and regulations of the Department of Transportation. 
(2) 'Tarticipating city" means any city having at least third class sta-
tus. 
(3) "Curb and gutter" means the area between the roadway and side-
walk designed for water runoff and safety of pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic. 
(4) "Pedestrian safety devices" means any device or method designed to 
foster the safety of pedestrian traffic. 
History: C. 1953, 27-14-3, enacted by L. Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 1. § 27-14-1. 
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27-14-4. Designated county and city sidewalks — Con-
struction on easements granted by transporta-
tion department 
(1) All sidewalks, including curbs and gutters within the unincorporated 
areas of a county and within nonparticipating cities or towns situated within 
the county, shall be designated county sidewalks. All sidewalks within partic-
ipating cities shall be designated city sidewalks. 
(2) Notwithstanding any other provision of law counties and participating 
cities may construct and maintain curbs, gutters, sidewalks and pedestrian 
safety devices adjacent to the traveled portion of state highways upon ease-
ments that may be granted by the state Department of Transportation. The 
state Department of Transportation shall cooperate with counties and partici-
pating cities to accomplish pedestrian safety construction and maintenance. 
History: C. 1963, 27-14-4, enacted by L. Cross-References.— Department of Trans-
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 1. portation, Chapter 49 of Title 63. 
27-14-5. Funding priorities by county and city officials — 
Factors. 
(1) The county commissioners of the counties and the governing officials of 
participating cities may establish funding priorities relating to construction of 
curbs, gutters, sidewalks or other pedestrian safety construction, with funds 
permitted to be expended by this act, based on factors including, but not 
limited to: 
(a) existing usable rights-of-way; 
(b) auto-pedestrian accident experience; 
(c) average daily automobile traffic; 
(d) average daily pedestrian traffic; 
(e) average daily school age pedestrian traffic; and 
(f) speed of automobile traffic. 
(2) All construction performed pursuant to this act shall be barrier free to 
wheelchairs at crosswalks and intersections. 
History: C. 1953, 27-14-5, enacted by L. Meaning of "this act." — See note under 
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § 1. § 27-14-1. 
27-14-6. Pedestrian safety to be considered in highway 
planning. 
Pedestrian safety considerations shall be included in all state highway engi-
neering and planning where pedestrian traffic would be a significant factor on 
all projects within the state or any of its political subdivisions. 
History: C. 1953, 27-14-fl, enacted by L. 
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 3, § L 
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63-30-4 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
Standiford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980). 
Test for determining governmental immu-
nity is whether the activity under consider-
ation is of such a unique nature that it can 
only be performed by a governmental agency, 
referring not to what government may do but 
to what government alone must do, or that it is 
essential to the core of governmental activity, 
referring to those activities not unique in 
themselves but essential to the performance of 
those activities that are uniquely governmen-
tal. Johnson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 629 R2d. 
432 (Utah 1981). 
Water system. 
Where city operated water system as a com* 
mercial venture in a proprietary capacity, ife 
was liable for injuries allegedly suffered by 
plaintiff when she stepped on loose water 
meter lid whether the meter was on plaintiffs, 
property or in the street. Gordon v. Provo City* 
15 Utah 2d 287, 391 P.2d 430 (1964). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Journal of Contemporary Law. — Defin-
ing Governmental Function Under the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, 9 J. Contemp. L. 
193 (1983). 
Journal of Energy Law and Policy. — 
Comment, The Only Way to Manage a Desert: 
Utah's Liability Immunity for Flood Control, 8 
J. Energy L. & Pol'y 95 (1987). 
A.L.R. — Liability of municipality for per-
sonal injury or death under mob violence or 
anti-lynchmg statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 1142. 
Liability of municipality for property dam-
age under mob violence statutes, 26 A.L.R.3d 
1198. 
Modern status of rule excusing governmen-
tal unit from tort liability on theory that only 
general, not particular, duty was owed under 
circumstances, 38 A.L.R.4th 1194. 
Governmental tort liability for failure to pro-
vide police protection to specifically threatened 
crime victim, 46 A.L.R.4th 948. 
Failure to restrain drunk driver as ground of 
liability of state or local governmental unit or 
officer, 48 A.L.R.4th 287. 
Governmental liability for failure to post 
highway deer crossing warning signs, 59 
A.L.R.4th 1217. 
State's liability for personal injuries from 
criminal attack in state park, 59 A.L.R.4th 
1236. 
Tort liability of public authority for failure 
to remove parentally abused or neglected chil-
dren from parents' custody, 60 A.L.R.4th 942: 
Tort liability of college or university for u> 
jury suffered by student as a result of own or 
fellow student's intoxication, 62 A.L.R.4th 81* 
Medical malpractice: hospital's liability for 
injury allegedly caused by failure to have pros*-
erly qualified staff, 62 A.L.R.4th 692. 
Liability to one struck by golf club, 631 
A.L.R.4th 221. 
Tort liability of college, university, fraterj 
nity, or sorority for injury or death of member 
or prospective member by hazing or initiatioS 
activity, 68 A.L.R.4th 228. 
Governmental liability for negligence in li-
censing, regulating, or supervising private 
day-care home in which child is injured, 6&* 
A.L.R.4th 266. 
Construction and application of Federal Tort 
Claims Act provision excepting from coverage* 
claims arising out of assault and battery (28 
USCS § 2680(h)), 88 A.L.R. Fed. 7. 
63-30-4. Act provisions not construed as admission or de-
nial of liability — Effect of waiver of immunity — 
Exclusive remedy — Joinder of employee — Lim-
itations on personal liability. 
(1) Nothing contained in this chapter, unless specifically provided, shall M 
construed as an admission or denial of liability or responsibility insofar aa 
governmental entities or their employees are concerned. If immunity from 
suit is waived by this chapter, consent to be sued is granted and liability of tlw 
entity shall be determined as if the entity were a private person. 
(2) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed as adversely affecting anH 
immunity from suit which a governmental entity or employee may otherwSa 
assert under state or federal law. 
(3) The remedy against a governmental entity or its employee for an injuiji 
caused by an act or omission which occurs during the performance of sucfc 
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oyee's duties, within the scope of employment, or under color of authority 
ter the effective date of this act, exclusive of any other civil action or 
eding by reason of the same subject matter against the employee or the 
e of the employee whose act or omission gave rise to the claim, unless the 
oyee acted or failed to act through fraud or malice. 
An employee may be joined in an action against a governmental entity 
representative capacity if the act or omission complained of is one for 
!i the governmental entity may be liable, but no employee may be held 
>nally liable for acts or omissions occurring during the performance of the 
oyee's duties, within the scope of employment or under color of authority, 
\s it is established that the employee acted or failed to act due to fraud or 
:e. 
tory: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 4; 1978, ch. 27, 
983, ch. 129, § 3. 
ss-References. — Compromise and set-
it, § 63-30-18. 
Payment of medical and similar expenses 
not admissible to prove liability for injury, 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 409. 




d sued in representative capacity. 
lal liability. 
licability of section. 
ledy for wrongful act. 
Q federal court. 
•nmental immunity. 
emmental function. 
le legislative delegation of certain 
s and duties surely establishes that the 
se and performance thereof is a govern-
1 function for purposes of a political sub-
m's authority to operate, it does not auto-
illy follow that the function qualifies as a 
•nmental function" for purposes of gov-
mtal immunity analysis. Loveland v. 
City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 (Utah 1987). 
i homeowner's suit based on failure to 
uct a fence around a canal adjacent to 
>use, the city's procedure in review and 
iral of the relevant subdivision plans did 
institute a governmental function, 
md v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763 
1987). 
al sued in representative capacity. 
rovernmental official or employee can 
e sued in a representative capacity when 
overnmental entity is liable; commis-
of Department of Financial Institutions 
not be sued in a representative capacity 
the state was not liable. Madsen v. 
ick. 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983). 
Personal liability. 
This section precludes personal liability of a 
governmental employee for acts or omissions 
occurring during the performance of his duties, 
unless the employee acted or failed to act 
through gross negligence, fraud or malice. 
Madsen v. Borthick, 658 P.2d 627 (Utah 1983) 
(decided prior to 1983 amendment). 
This section barred negligence claims 
against individual police officers, where plain-
tiff did not allege that the officers acted with 
fraud or malice in beating him after an alleged 
wrongful arrest. Maddocks v. Salt Lake City 
Corp., 740 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1987). 
—Applicability of section. 
Where parents contended that they were not 
subject to the 1978 amendment of this section 
because their cause of action accrued at the 
time they received and relied upon the negli-
gent advice of the doctors in 1977 that they 
could safely have another child, it was held 
that the injury in a wrongful birth claim can-
not precede the birth of the child, which was 10 
months after the effective date of the 1978 
amendment to this section. Since there was no 
allegation of gross negligence, fraud, or malice 
this section precluded the personal liability of 
the doctors. Payne ex rel. Payne v. Myers, 743 
P.2d 186 (Utah 1987). 
The 1983 amendment of this section deleting 
the provision making employees personally lia-
ble for gross negligence should be applied pro-
spectively only. Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d 
245 (Utah 1988). 
—Remedy for wrongful act. 
The 1978 amendment to this section did not 
leave the parents without a remedy for their 
wrongful birth injury by granting immunity 
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NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Construction and application. 
The waiver of immunity from suit "for the 
recovery of any property real or personal or for 
the possession thereof does not include an ac-
tion for damages for impairment of access to 
property caused by construction of highway 
underpass; this act should be strictly construed 
to preserve sovereign immunity and to waive it 
only as clearly expressed therein. Holt v. Utah 
State Rd. Comm., 30 Utah 2d 4, 511 P.2d 1286 
(1973). 
63-30-7, Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op-
rf-^d //oo eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury result-
ing from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle or other 
equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope of employ-
ment, or under color of authority; provided, however, that this section shall 
not apply to the operation of emergency vehicles as defined by law and while 
being driven in accordance with the requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 7; 1983, ch. 
129, § 5. 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R. — Admiralty jurisdiction: maritime 
lature of tort — modern cases, 80 A.LJR. Fed. 
L05. 
53-30-8. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by defec-
'P.Jsi UZA tive, unsafe, or dangerous condition of highways, 
bridges, or other structures. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
aused by a defective, unsafe, or dangerous condition of any highway, road, 
treet, alley, crosswalk, sidewalk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct or other 
tructure located thereon. 
History: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 8. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 





e and snow on sidewalk. 
'anholes. 
egligent construction. 




Complaint, sufficiency of allegations. 
Claim for injuries "sustained on or about 
January 15, 1902, while walking on the side-
walk along First West street between Seventh 
and Eighth South, * * * through the negligence 
of the city in suffering * * * a fence * * * to be 
on said sidewalk," not having misled the city, 
was sufficiently definite. Connor v. Salt Lake 
City, 28 Utah 248, 78 P. 479 (1904). 
Where plaintiff sustained damages to his au-
tomobile on city streets, and presented a claim 
for "necessary repairs to automobile $133," he 
cannot claim and recover additional damages 
for $1,000 for its "depreciation in value and 
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ot to private developments, such as an imga-
on canal owned by a pnvate company, 
oveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P2d 763 
Jtah 1987). 
raffle signs. 
The maintenance and repair of traffic signs 
is a governmental function for which immu-
nity from suit has been expressly waived and 
which is not within the discretionary function 
exception. Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P2d 276 
(Utah 1985). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
A.L.R- — Highways: governmental duty to 
•ovide curve warnings or markings, 57 
.L.R.4th 342. 
Governmental tort liability as to highway 
edian barriers, 58 A.L.R.4th 559. 
Governmental tort liability for injury to rol-
r skater allegedly caused by sidewalk or 
reet defects, 58 A.L.R.4th 1197. 
Legal aspects of speed bumps, 60 A.L.R.4th 
1249. 
Highway contractor's liability to highway 
user for highway surface defects, 62 A.L.R.4th 
1067. 
State and local government liability for in-
jury or death of bicyclist due to defect or ob-
struction in public bicycle path, 68 A.L R.4th 
204. 
3-30-9. Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
'aci//ao defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. ~7$o f-od XlQ? 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for any injury 
Lused from a dangerous or defective condition of any public building, struc-
ire, dam, reservoir or other public improvement. Immunity is not waived for 
tent defective conditions. 
History: L- 1965, ch. 139, § 9. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
tent defective condition. 
>ghgent construction. 
>tice to city. 
usance action. 
her public improvement. 
ivate developments. 
ted. 
tent defective condition. 
Defect in a county storm dram that was dis-
rerable by a reasonable inspection was not a 
ent defect. Vincent v. Salt Lake County, 583 
Id 105 (Utah 1978). 
gligent construction. 
Vhere university construction diverted flow 
surface water, flooding basement and caus-
\ other damage to adjoining landowner, gov-
ufcental immunity was waived and univer-
f was liable to landowner. Sanford v. Uni-
•sity of Utah, 26 Utah 2d 285, 488 P 2d 741 
71). 
tice to city. 
Requirement that notice of claim be given to 
itical subdivision within ninety days (now 
one year) in § 63-30-13 is applicable to this 
section. Parnsh v Layton City Corp , 542 P 2d 
1086 (Utah 1975) (decided under former law). 
Nuisance action. 
Intent of legislature was to include within 
the waiver of immunity an action for pnvate 
nuisance in so far as the action is predicated on 
a dangerous or defective condition of a public 
improvement that unreasonably interferes 
with the use and enjoyment of the claimant's 
property. Sanford v. University of Utah, 26 
Utah 2d 285, 488 P2d 741 (1971). 
Other public improvement 
Damages to house and basement partially 
incurred from defective conditions of sewer 
dram and canal fell under purview of this sec-
tion. Parnsh v. Layton City Corp., 542 P2d 
1086 (Utah 1975). 
Private developments. 
This section's waiver of immunity for mju-
nes caused by defective conditions applies only 
with regard to conditions on property in the 
public use, not on pnvate developments such 
as an lingation canal owned by a pnvate com-
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63-30-7 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
ment, was not engaged as a governmental en- gence in the resurfacing of a school parking lot, 
tity in the "management of flood waters" so as which resulted in surface water runoff on an 
to be immune from suit. Branam v. Provo adjoining landowner's property. Williams v. 
School Dist, 780 P.2d 810 (Utah 1989). Carbon County Bd. of Educ, 780 P.2d 816 
School district was not shielded from possi- (Utah 1989). 
ble liability for damages arising from its negli-
63-30-7. Waiver of immunity for injury from negligent op-
eration of motor vehicles — Exception. 
(1) (a) Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury 
resulting from the negligent operation by any employee of a motor vehicle 
or other equipment during the performance of his duties, within the scope 
of employment, or under color of authority. 
(b) This subsection does not apply to the operation of emergency vehi-
cles as defined by law and while being driven in accordance with the 
requirements of Section 41-6-14. 
(2) (a) All governmental entities employing peace officers retain and do not 
waive immunity from liability for civil damages for personal injury or 
death or for damage to property resulting from the collision of a vehicle 
being operated by an actual or suspected violator of the law who is being, 
has been, or believes he is being or has been pursued by a peace officer 
employed by the governmental entity in a motor vehicle. 
(b) Enactment of this subsection does not state nor imply that this 
immunity was ever previously waived or this liability specifically or im-
plicitly recognized. 
History: L. 1965, ch- 139, § 7; 1983, ch. ment, effective April 23, 1990, designated the 
129, § 5; 1990, ch. 204, § 1. former section as Subsection (1); added Subsec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend- tion (2); and made related stylistic changes. 
63-30-9- Waiver of immunity for injury from dangerous or 
defective public building, structure, or other 
public improvement — Exception. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Cited in Rocky Mt. Thrift Stores, Inc. v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989). 
63-30-10. Waiver of immunity for injury caused by negli-
gent act or omission of employee — Exceptions. 
Immunity from suit of all governmental entities is waived for injury proxi-
mately caused by a negligent act or omission of an employee committed 
within the scope of employment except if the injury arises out of: 
(1) the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function, whether or not the discretion is abused; 
(2) assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prose-
cution, intentional trespass, abuse of process, libel, slander, deceit, inter-
ference with contract rights, infliction of mental anguish, or civil rights; 
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3) the issuance, denial, suspension, or revocation of or by the failure or 
iisal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke any permit, license, certificate, 
proval, order, or similar authorization; 
4) a failure to make an inspection or by making an inadequate or 
gligent inspection of any property; 
[5) the institution or prosecution of any judicial or administrative pro-
dding, even if malicious or without probable cause; 
;6) a misrepresentation by the employee whether or not it is negligent 
intentional; 
(7) or results from riots, unlawful assemblies, public demonstrations, 
)b violence, and civil disturbances; 
(8) or in connection with the collection of and assessment of taxes; 
(9) the activities of the Utah National Guard; 
(10) the incarceration of any person in any state prison, county or city 
il, or other place of legal confinement; 
(11) any natural condition on state lands or as the result of any activity 
ithorized by the Board of State Lands and Forestry; 
(12) research or implementation of cloud management or seeding for 
ie clearing of fog; or 
(13) the activities of: 
(a) providing emergency medical assistance; 
(b) fighting fire; 
(c) regulating, mitigaung, or handling hazardous materials or haz-
ardous wastes; 
(d) emergency evacuations; or 
(e) intervening during dam emergencies. 
Dry: L. 1965, ch. 139, § 10; 1975, ch. Subsection (2), waiving immunity from suit for 
11; 1982, ch. 10, § 1; 1985, ch. 169, § 1; violation of Fourth Amendment rights and 
:h. 185, § 1; 1989, ch. 187, § 3; 1989, making the provisions of Chapter 16 of Title 78 
3, § 29; 1990, ch. 15, §§ 1, 2; 1990, ch. the exclusive remedy for injuries caused by 
\ 1, 2. such violations. 
jndment Notes. — The 1990 amend- The 1990 amendment by ch. 319, effective 
\y ch. 15, effective July 1, 1990, deleted July 1, 1990, added Subsection (13)(e) and 
!>8ection designation (1) from the begin- made a related stylistic change. 
f the section, redesignated former Sub- This section is set out as reconciled by the 
is (l)(a) to (1X1) as Subsections (1) to (13) (Mice of Legislative Research and General 
ade related changes, and deleted former Counsel. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS Decisions regarding the design, capacity, 
and construction of a flood control system were 
tionary function. discretionary functions. Rocky Mt. Thrift 
ed prisoner. Stores, Inc. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 
«s. 459 (Utah 1989). 
etionary function. Escaped prisoner. 
iged negligent conduct of a county em- Bailiffs action against state for gunshot 
j in operating a backhoe pursuant to a wound inflicted by a prisoner was properly dis-
ir program of dredging stream channels missed, because either (1) the prisoner had 
ar away silt, gravel deposits, debris, and totally escaped the control of the officers es-
matter which obstructed the flow of corting him and was thus acting on his own so 
• did not fall within the discretionary the officers were not responsible for him, or (2) 
ton exception of Subsection (1). Irvine v. he was still under the control of the officers, in 
lake County, 785 P.2d 411 (Utah 1989). which case the officers would be immune from 
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